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Abstract 
Commercial banks play a critical role in mobilization of resources from surplus to deficit units required to foster 
economic growth and development especially in developing countries. Although, in quite a number of these 
countries the need for development of sound corporate governance has been recognized as critical in enhancing 
stability in the banking sector, research on the links between governance at firm level and corporate performance 
in commercial banks has been scanty. This paper has explored this issue, paying particular attention on the 
relationship between corporate board independence and  the performance of commercial banks in Kenya for the 
period spanning 2001 to 2013. A period within which Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) issued three prudential 
guidelines on corporate governance that all commercial banks operating in Kenya must adhere to. 
Primary data for the study was obtained from 33 of the 43 commercial banks in Kenya by way of questionnaire 
administration, whereas secondary data was obtained from: annual published accounts, Nairobi Stock Exchange 
Publications, returns filed to the Registrar of companies at the Attorney General Chambers Nairobi, individual 
banks websites and Central Bank of Kenya website. Bank performance was defined by three key performance 
variables namely: ROA (Return on asset), ROE (Return on equity) and TBQ ratio (Tobin’s Q ratio); that are: 
financial, accounting and market measures of performance respectively. Bank size was adopted in the study as a 
moderating variable to capture bank specific characteristics. The data collected was analyzed using hierarchical 
regression under the panel data framework using SPSS 21.0 version. The key results indicated that board 
composition was not significant in the relationship between board composition and performance of commercial 
banks in Kenya. The results further indicated that there was no linear relationship between board composition 
and the TBQ ratio of commercial banks in Kenya when bank specific characteristics were excluded. Therefore if 
commercial banks in Kenya are to improve their performance they should direct their efforts towards other 
variables other than board composition.  
Keywords and abbreviations: Board composition, Banks performance, Corporate Governance, Central Bank of 
Kenya. 
V.I.F. is Variance inflation factor, ROE is return on equity, ROA is return on asset, and TBQ ratio is Tobin’s Q 
ratio 
 
1. Introduction 
The directors of corporate boards have been the focus of quite a number of management and finance studies for 
over a century and continue to provide a rich base to governance-performance literature. Corporate governance 
studies in banking firms their effects on performance have received less attention compared to related studies in 
industrial firms (Belkhir 2008). Understanding board composition in the banks is critical in understanding the 
ability of these boards to deliver on various parameters that can foster performance. It is also a basis upon which 
proposed reforms in board selection can be evaluated too. All the main theories of governance, whether 
shareholder or stakeholder-focused, point to the fact that boards of directors of a company are the cornerstones 
of good governance. Nevertheless, despite the unwavering interest and voluminous research into the relationship 
between corporate boards and firm performance, empirical results display a remarkable lack of consensus (Zajac 
& Westphal, 1996). 
 
2. Review of related literature 
Corporate governance can generally be defined as “the sum total of organizational mechanisms geared towards 
limiting the managers’ powers and influence in decision making process; notably these related to funding and 
investment (Pichet, 2013). The ways a firm invests shareholders funds determines its performance and goes a 
long way in determining  its ability to achieve its objectives. Board composition denotes the percentage of board 
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members who are employees of organizations (internal board members) and those who are outsiders. Outside 
directors are at times referred to as independent directors or non-executive directors they do not participate in the 
day to day running of the company (Enobakhare, 2010). Independent  directors hold a special status as leading 
protagonists in companies’ boards (Pichet, 2013).  
The focus on board independence is grounded in the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983). From the 
banking sector perspective, board composition is expected to play an important role in synchronizing the interest 
of managers and those of the shareholders. It is widely argued that the presence of directors who are not 
employees of the bank may enhance the effectiveness of the board in monitoring managers, and hence improve 
bank value and performance. This is because independent directors are more likely to defend the interests of 
external shareholders better compared to internal directors. Weisbach (1988) in the study of the efficiency of 
Chief Executive Officer monitoring mechanism between inside and outside directors finds that: outside directors 
play an important role in monitoring the Chief Executive Officer and are more likely than inside-dominated 
board of directors to replace a non performing Chief Executive Officer. The banks’ corporate governance system 
is based on three principles: to receive non-confidential information on how the bank is functioning, to 
effectively control the bank and its managers through deliberations in general meetings and to foster  banks’ 
long-term interests in tandem with those of the shareholders; more specifically shareholders wealth 
maximization. These three principles can well be achieved when a great proportion of the bank’s board of 
directors are independent. 
The corporate governance structure of banks in Kenya as provided by the prudential guidelines issued 
by the Central bank of Kenya requires that the number outside directors be more than that of the executive 
directors.  The non-executive directors must comprise of independent directors appointed on the basis of 
experience, gender and professionalism that can bring a different inputs to counter the problems faced by the 
management that generally constrain bank performance. Independent board of directors should serve a valuable 
advisory role that is likely to be particularly important in such complex firms. Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that 
outside directors have the incentive to act as monitors of management and hence improve firm performance 
because they would want to protect their reputations as effective independent decision makers. The basic 
argument has been that if board composition, as represented by independent directors, is to affect the banks 
performance positively, it should be inversely related to earning management and in the same context; if board 
composition negatively influences corporate performance, then it should positively influence the opportunistic 
behavior of managers (Hassan, 2012).  
Shems et al. (2007) finds that the more the board is independent, the better the performance of Thai 
banks. The above findings are supported by those of Kor & Misangyi (2008)  that; the presence of outside 
directors who have significant managerial and industrial experience compensate for inadequacy of management 
experience in young firms. This is in line with the resource dependency theory that advocates for the fresh ideas 
that the board of directors working for different organizations and sitting on the boards of many organizations 
will inject in the firm and hence boost their performance. Busta (2007) while examining a sample of 69 listed 
banks from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK over the period spanning 1996 to 2005 and a sample of 125 
banks operating in 15 European union member countries and Switzerland during 2004 finds that; banks with a 
higher number of independent directors perform better in terms of the market-to-book value and return on 
invested capital (ROIC) in the Continental Europe , while the opposite is true for UK where no significant 
correlation was detected in terms of ROA. Brook et al. (2000) while examining the impact of corporate 
governance and pay-for-performance on earnings management using 100 largest firms in the U.S. as ranked by 
Standard and Poor between 1994-2003 find that outside directors’ enforce managers to act in the interest of 
shareholders by accepting takeover bids that are high.  Brewer III et al. (2000) find that bid premiums offered for 
target banks increase with the proportion of independent outside directors.  
Committee memberships in the banking firms are incomplete in absence of  independent directors of 
the board. Hence, it is expected that banks should have a large proportion of independent directors than firms in 
other sectors of the economy (Central Bank of Kenya, 2013). From the above argument, it is expected that the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance should be positive. Ferris et al. (2003) in 
examining the number of external appointments held by corporate directors finds that there is no evidence that 
calls for limits on directorships held by an individual. Brewer III et al. (2000) find that bid premiums offered for 
target banks increase with the proportion of independent outside directors. 
Hartarska, (2005) examined the link between the governance mechanisms and performance of micro 
finance institutions in Central and Eastern European countries. The findings of the study were that: boards with 
greater external representation have better financial performance. Similar findings were made by Hartarska & 
Mersland (2012) and Mori & Mersland (in press), who used a large sample to study which governance measures 
promoted efficiency in reaching poor clients.  Using the agency and stakeholder theories as a basis for their 
arguments, they looked at measures such as board size, board composition and managerial composition. Their 
findings were that micro finance institutions with a larger proportion of insiders on the board are less efficient. 
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On overall they concluded that micro finance institutions boards with many internal members do not impact on 
social and financial performance of a firm 
Despite the above positive effects that accrue to banks and firms with the existence of a high 
proportion of independent directors in the board. Several studies have reported findings to the contrary. Fich & 
Shivdasani (2006) find that weak corporate governance is related to the presence of directors involved in more 
than three boards although a firm may not have the knowledge and control on the number of boards a director 
could be serving. Cornet et al. (2007) find that the presence of independent outside directors reduces earnings 
management because independent boards constrain managers’ discretionary behavior that may be geared 
towards improving firm performance. Similar findings were made by Roodposhti & Chashmi (2010) in a study 
of 196 firms listed on Tehran Stock Exchange in Iran between 2004-2008, that a negative relationship exists 
between board independence and earnings management. Outside board of directors were also found to have a 
disadvantage that they may lack relevant firm-specific information which is likely to be problematic especially 
for small growth firms ( Adams and Ferreira, 2007). 
Insider directors have three major advantages over outsiders on the company’s board. They are better 
informed about the issues and problems affecting the firm’s business (Hilman and Dalziel, 2003). This may 
explain the reason why empirical evidence supports the fact that there is no correlation between the number of 
outside directors and the financial performance of the firm (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The second 
important advantage is underlined in the fact that inside directors do lessen the board’s dependence on Chief 
Executive Officers for supply of information. This is because they are able to provide the board with a well-
informed source of inside information that has not been filtered by the Chief Executive Officers and thirdly 
inside directors normally have superior explicit and tacit knowledge, on specific issues and problems facing the 
firm. Sanders & Boivie (2004) while referring to internet firms find that; in the post-IPO stage, the market 
prefers insider-dominated boards because they have greater access to the kind of information that is subjective 
regarding the top-management performance and may be more useful when information processing at the board 
level is critical. 
Child & Rodrigues, (2004) find that inside directors have the ability to mitigate the problem of double 
agency-relationship that take the form of conflicts between the owners and management and conflicts between 
the management and employees including the inability of outside directors who are Chief Executive officers of 
other firms to seriously challenge the firm’s policies especially those related to the remuneration of executives. It 
widely acknowledged that outside Chief Executive Officers serving as board of directors in other companies 
normally view the board through Chief Executive Officer eyes in a manner which does not seriously challenge 
the power of the incumbent Chief Executive Officer. O’Reilly et al. (1988) in their study find that, as far as the 
Chief Executive Officer compensation are concerned, the pay of the compensation committee members were a 
better predictor of the Chief Executive Officers compensation than the actual performance of the firm. Therefore 
the membership of employees in the compensation committees would have a moderating effect upon the mutual 
hiking of compensations by the cross-board membership by outside Chief Executive Officers who are board 
members. These findings are in line with those of Berle & Means (1932) that corporate boards had neither the 
incentive nor the ability to objectively represent the interests of shareholders rather than providing independent 
oversight for top management decision making processes, and would simply rubber stamp the executive 
decisions.  
Considering the relationship between financial performance and board composition, Hermalin & 
Weisbach (1991) in their study on the effect of board composition on financial performance of listed companies 
in the United States using a sample of 142 companies listed on the New York stock exchange and pooled data of 
five years found that there was no strong relationship between board composition and firms’ financial 
performance. According to them board composition simply does not matter since both Inside and outside 
directors are equally bad or possibly good at representing shareholders’ interests. These findings were supported 
by Dalton, Daily et al. (1998) that little correlation existed between board composition and corporate financial 
performance among 54 empirical studies they had undertaken and that no correlation existed between leadership 
structure and financial performance among 31 empirical studies they had undertaken too.   
Pi and Timme (1993) and Adams & Mehran (2002) find that the proportion of outside directors is not 
related to performance measures because the presence of outside directors on the firm’s board entails costs to the 
firm, that take the form of fees, travel expenses, stocks and stock-options. They recommended that banks should 
use higher numbers of outside directors only when the other corporate control mechanisms are weak. Shah et al. 
(2009), in their study on the relationship between board composition and earnings management in Pakistani 
listed companies for the period between 2003 and 2007 also find no significant relationship between board 
composition and earnings management.  
Boone, Fields, Karpo & Raheja (2007), Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2008), Lehn, Patro & Zhao (2008) 
and Linck, et al. (2008) provide evidence in samples of non-financial firms that the proportion of outsiders on 
the board is positively related to measures of firm complexity, such as size. Peng (2004) on the other hand 
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suggests that outsider directors do make a difference in firm performance, if such performance is measured by 
sales growth, though they have little impact on financial performance such as return on equity (ROE).  
Overall, it is expected that if board independence can constrain managers to play along the line of 
shareholders’ wealth maximization objective, then it should be positively related to firm performance when the 
true financial performance is considered rather the reported earnings that is marred by the impact of earnings 
management. captured in annual financial reports.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
The primary aim of the study was to analyze the relationship between corporate governance and performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya for the period spanning 2000 to 2013. To achieve the general objective of the study, 
a survey was conducted on all banks incorporated and operating in Kenya during the period. The target 
population for the study was the Company Secretary or a Senior Manager in charge of Corporate Affairs at each 
of the 43 commercial banks head offices. The study made use of annual audited financial reports of individual 
banks found on the banks website and the Central Bank of Kenya website, returns filed at the Registrar of 
Companies office at the Attorney General Chambers Nairobi and Nairobi Securities Exchange publications. 
Primary data was collected using a questionnaire that was administered to either the Senior Manager in charge of 
Corporate Affairs or the Company Secretary. This was in line with the advocacy of the Basel Committee on 
Banking and Supervision that governance structure should be composed of board of directors and Senior 
Management (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012). The questionnaire was used in gathering general information on board 
composition variable that had not been captured in the annual financial reports. 
A pilot study was conducted on one bank that was picked through random sampling to which the 
questionnaire was administered to the Senior Manager in charge of Corporate Affairs.  This exercise was done 
before the main data collection exercise commenced. The rule of the thumb that 1% of the respondents should be 
picked for a pilot study as recommended by Nachmias &Nachmias (2008) and Sekaran & Bougie, (2009) was 
applied. The contents of the questionnaire were thoroughly discussed with the respondent with a view of 
identifying any shortfall in the instrument. Issues raised in respect to measurement were adjusted without 
changing the meaning. However, the pilot study sample was not allowed to participate in the main study. 
The reliability of the questionnaire was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha coefficients. Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients are used in measuring the internal consistency of the questionnaire instrument. The value of 
the alpha coefficient ranges from 0-1.  
The Alpha Cronbach’s formula is as given : 
)1(
1 Vtest
Vi
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n ∑
−
−
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Where          α      - Cronbach’s Alpha. 
                     n       - The test lets (number of items to be tested). 
                     Vi      - Variance of observed total test scores.  
                     V-
 test –Total variance of overall scores on the entire test (not % s)        
A higher alpha value shows a higher level of reliability. According to Coopers and Schindler, (2008), 
an alpha value of 0.7 and above is an acceptable reliability coefficient. Since secondary data was drawn from the 
published annual financial reports of banks, they were presumed to be reliable. 
The data collected was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Under inferential statistics, 
hierarchical regression analysis under the panel data framework was used. Hierarchical regression analysis was 
used in determining the relationship between board composition variable and performance variables. The study 
measured the goodness to fit the regression model for Return on equity, Return on Assets and Tobin’s Q ratio 
using r-squared value. The research also observed significant P-value. Descriptive statistics  were used to 
quantitatively describe the important features of the variables using  mean, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation.  
 
3.1 Model Specification and Variable Definition 
The researcher employed a hierarchical regression model of analysis under the panel data framework. That was 
as follows: 
Yit =βo+β1 X1it+β2X2it 
Yit =βo+β1 X1it+β2X2it + εit 
Where: 
Yit -Is bank performance measured by Return on assets, Return on Equity and Tobin’s Q ratio. 
Subscripts i and t represent firm and time period, respectively. 
βo-The intercept of the model. 
X1-Board composition. Calculated as the number of non executive directors divided by the total number of 
directors. 
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X2-Moderating variable bank size measured by log of total assets. 
εit   -Is an error term.    
The empirical model included bank size as a moderating variable related to bank specific characteristics. Related 
studies such as: Htaly, (2012) and Bino & Tomar, (2007) had used this variable. In their studies. Only one bank 
specific characteristic; bank size was used in the model. Other characteristics were captured by the error term. 
 
3.2 Independent Variables and Dependent Variables 
Board composition was the independent variable in the study whereas the dependent variables constituted of 
three performance measures namely: 
(1) Tobin’s Q ratio: This is a market measure of performance  given by the formula    
            Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) = Market value of Equity 
                                                  Net worth of the firm   
Where market value of equity is the difference between the market value of the firm and the value of debt and 
net worth is the amount by which the assets exceed the liabilities. 
For unquoted banks the researcher calculated the estimated market value of their shares based on the formula: 
similar characteristics to the quoted one in terms of share holders  
 
Where Est. Mkt value of equity of unquoted bank- is estimated value of equity of unquoted bank. 
Where Est. Mkt value of equity of unquoted bank: Is estimated market value of unquoted bank. 
Both the numerator and the denominator were measured at the same date. 
(2) Return on Equity (ROE): This is a financial measure of performance it indicates how effective the 
management team in a company is converting the reinvested money into profits. The higher the company’s ROE 
the more the money a company is able to generate for the same shilling amount spent. 
               ROE= Net income (Profit after tax) 
                           Shareholders’ equity 
Where - The profit before tax  is as listed in the company’s annual financial report. 
 -Shareholders equity=Total assets-Total liabilities (CBK 2001-2013) 
(3) Return on Assets. This is a purely accounting-based measure computed from the banks financial statement 
data. Each bank’s earnings after tax are divided by total assets (CBK 2001-2013). 
                ROA =   Profit before tax           
                                Total assets  
 
4. Findings 
The Cronbach’s alpha of items on board composition that were responded to via the questionnaire was 0.788. 
These values were above the 0.70 threshold as recommended by Zinbarg, (2005) implying that the data collected 
had achieved a relatively high level of consistency and could be generalized to be representative of the target 
population and could be used for further analysis. 
However it was observed that board composition had 18 items. Given the higher number of variables 
this variable was subjected to factor analysis so as to reduce the number of items required for analysis. Factor 
analysis technique was considered appropriate because it did not require any preexisting functional relationships 
in the data and it is well known for data reduction. 
 
4.1 Testing Adequacy of sample for factor analysis 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was used in testing the sampling adequacy of the data collected on board 
composition using the questionnaire for factor analysis. This measure ranges between 0 and 1. The K.M.O. 
values closer to 1 are considered better whereas the value greater than 0.5 are considered adequate (Leech et. al 
2005). Along with this measure, the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was used in testing the null hypothesis that the 
correlation matrix had an identity matrix. The results of these two tests were used in determining the minimum 
standard required to proceed with factor analysis. To aid in the analysis the table 4.2 below was generated. 
 
Table 1 KMO Bartlett’s Test 
Particulars Values 
Kaiser Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy .596 
Approximate chi square 328.363 
Barletts Test of Sphericity                           Df 153 
Sig. .000 
 
   Est. Mkt value of equity of unquoted bank =Current price of   X    Own funds (of unquoted bank)  
                                                                         quoted bank.               Own funds (of quoted bank) 
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Normally, if 0 < KMO < 1 and if KMO > 0.5, the sample is adequate. From the results obtained in table 1 above 
KMO was 0.596  and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity at 95% level of confidence was significant (the p-value of 
.000 < 0.05). The results indicated that the items were adequate for factor analysis and hence paved way for the 
researcher to proceed with the factor analysis. 
Factor analysis process on this data led to the retention of the six of the initial eighteen items. 
 
Figure 1 Scree plot 
The fact that six of the eighteen items were retained for further analysis was supported by the break in the scree 
plot after the sixth item as shown in figure 1 above.  
 
Table 2 Communalities of board composition variables 
Board composition factors Initial  Extraction 
Whether the board is truly independent 1.000 .798 
Board has the responsibility of selecting the banks CEO 1.000 .792 
Board is a forum of serious discussions 1.000 .857 
Board has ability to revise key executive decisions including remuneration 1.000 .835 
Board reviews potential conflict of interest including related parties transactions 1.000 .815 
Board ensures integrity of the bank’s financial reporting 1.000 .884 
The items that remained had factor loadings of between 0.792 and 0.884 as shown in table 2 above. 
Hair et. al (1998) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend a cut off factor of 0.40 on factor loadings in 
determining the factors to be retained for further analysis. Given that all the six items had a factor loading above 
the 0.4 threshold they were all retained and used in further analysis. This paved way for further analysis and 
detailed discussion on board composition in the subsequent section of the study. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 .presents some descriptive statistics regarding board composition and performance measures for 
commercial banks in Kenya over the period 2001-2013. 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Particulars N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation 
ROA 416 -.13 .37 .0259 .03829 
ROE 416 -.67 1.25 .1238 .14974 
TBQ ratio 416 .00 9.13 .9367 .14224 
Bank size 416 2.88 5.51 4.1152 .60476 
Board composition 416 .17 .92 .6747 .13890 
From the data of 416 observations shown in table 3 above  it can be revealed that with a board of 
which on average 67.47% of the directors were independent directors  with a maximum of 92% and a minimum 
of 17%, that deviated by 13.89% both sides of the mean, Kenyan commercial banks  reported an average return 
on asset of 2.59%  with the highest/ maximum of  37% and a minimum of -13% that deviated by 3.823% on both 
sides of the mean. These banks also reported an average return on equity of 12.38% with a maximum of 125% 
and a minimum of -67% that deviated by 14.974% on both sides of the mean and an average Tobin’s Q ratio of 
.9367, with a maximum of 9.13 and a minimum of zero that deviated by 1.42247 on both sides of the mean using 
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an average asset  size of kshs.13,119 million (antilog. of 4.1179), with  a maximum of kshs.323,594 million 
(antilog. of 5.51) and a minimum of kshs.759 million (antilog of 2.88) that deviated on both sides of the mean by 
kshs.4.03 million.  
 
4.3 Hierarchical Regression 
Hierarchical regression was used in the analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and board 
composition. The performance indicators used in the study were: ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q ratio taking into 
account the effect of bank size / a moderating variable on these performance indicators each at a time. The null 
hypothesis for the entry of the moderating variable (bank size) to the analysis was that the change in R2 was zero. 
If the null hypothesis was to be rejected then the interpretation was to indicate that the variables in block 2 or 
step 2 had a relationship with the dependent variable after moderating of block 1 or step 1 variables to the 
dependent variable. 
The statistical significance of the previously entered variables was not interpreted. Hierarchical regression 
analysis focuses on the change in R².  If the change in R² is statistically significant, the overall relationship for all 
independent variables will be significant as well.  
To guide the analysis three simple definition models were adopted as illustrated: 
Model 1: 
Table 4. Model Summaryc 
Model R R-Square Adjusted R -Square R-Square change F change df1 df2 Sig. 
1 .049a .002 .000 .002 .982 1 414 .322 
2 .270b .073 .069 .071 31.531 1 413 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant)  Board composition, 
b. Predictors: (Constant) Board composition, Bank size. 
c. Dependent variable: ROA 
 
Table 5. Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
    
 B Std Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance V.I.F. 
1 (Constant) .035 .009  3.718 .000   
2. Board 
composition 
-.013 .014 -.049 .991 .322 1 1 
1.(Constant) -.034 .015  -2.218 .027   
2.Board 
composition 
-.015 .013 -.054 -1.146 .253 1 1 
3.Bank size .017 -.003 .266 5.615 .000 1 1 
a. Dependent Variable ROA 
In the first step of the hierarchical regression in model 1(Table 4), ROA is entered as a performance indicator 
and board composition as predictor variable. This model is found not to be statistically significant (F (1,414) 
=.322; P> .005) and  the model explains .02% of variance in ROA. After entry of bank size in step 2 as a 
moderating variable the total variance explained by the model as a whole is 7.3% (F (1,413) = 31.531; P< .05). 
This represents an additional 7.1% variance in ROA (R2 change= .071; F (1,413) = 31.531; P< .05). In the final 
model (Table 5) only bank size is statistically significant at 5% level whereas board composition, is not 
statistically significant.   
Model 2. 
 
Table 6. Model Summaryc 
Model R R-Square Adjusted R -Square R-Square change F change df1 df2 Sig. 
1 .060a .004 .001 .004 1.479 1 414 .225 
2 .414b .171 .167 .168 83.587 1 413 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant) Board composition, 
b.Predictors: (Constant) Board composition, Bank size. 
C.Dependent variable: ROE 
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Table 7. Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
    
 B Std Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance V.I.F. 
1 (Constant) .168 .037  4.598 .000   
2. Board 
composition 
-.065 .053 -.060 -1.216 .225 1 1 
1.(Constant) -.034 .053  -2.218 .027   
2.Board 
composition 
-.074 .049 -.068 -1.525 .128 1 1 
3.Bank size .101 .011 .410 9.143 .000 1 1 
a. Dependent Variable ROA 
In the first step of model 2(Table 6), ROE is entered as a performance indicator and board composition as 
predictor. This model is found not to be statistically significant (F (1,414) = .225; P> .005) and the model 
explains .04% of variance in ROE. After entry of bank size in step 2 as a moderating variable the total variance 
explained by the model as a whole rises 17.1% (F (1,413) = 83.587; P< .05). The introduction of bank size as a 
moderating variable explains an additional 16.8% variance in ROE (R2 change= .168; F (1,413) = 83.587; P< 
.05). In the final model (Table 7) only bank size is statistically significant at 5% level.  Board composition 
however, is not statistically significant at 5% level.   
Model 3 
 
Table 8. Model Summaryc 
Model R R-Square Adjusted R -Square R-Square change F change df1 df2 Sig. 
1 .006a .000 .002 .000 .014 1 414 .905 
2 .563b .317 .314 .317 192.002 1 413 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant) Board composition, 
b.Predictors: (Constant) Board composition, Bank size. 
c.Dependent variable: TBQ ratio. 
 
Table 9. Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
    
 B Std Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance V.I.F. 
1 (Constant) .898 .347  2.586 .000   
2. Board 
composition 
.060 .505 .006 .119 .905 1 1 
1.(Constant) 4.473 .482  -9.273 .000   
2.Board 
composition 
-.063 .418 -.006 -1.50 .881 1 1 
3.Bank size 1.324 .096 .563 13.856 .000 1 1 
a. Dependent Variable TBQ ratio 
In the first step of model 3 (Table 8), TBQ ratio entered as a performance indicator and board 
composition as predictor variable. This model is found not to be statistically significant (F (1,414) =.905; P> 
.005) and is not able to explain the variance in TBQ ratio (R2=0). After entry of bank size in step 2 as a 
moderating variable the total variance explained by the model as a whole rises to 31.7% (F (1,413) =192.002 P< 
.05) and in this case the model is statistically significant. The introduction of bank size as a moderating variable 
explains an additional 31.7% variance in TBQ ratio (R2 change= .317; F (1,413) = 192.002; P< .05). In the final 
model (Table 9) only bank size is statistically significant at 5% level.  Board composition is found not to be 
statistically significant at 5% level.   
The results of the regressions in the three models shows that board composition was not significant in 
the relationship between board composition and  performance of commercial banks in Kenya when and ROE, 
ROA and TBQ ratio were used as performance indicators.  
The results of the study point to the fact that there  is no linear relationship between board composition 
and commercial bank performance when TBQ ratio is adopted as a performance measure in absence of the 
moderating variable (bank size). This invariably means that when trying to ascertain the relationship between 
board composition and performance of commercial banks in Kenya one needs to take into consideration bank 
specific characteristics..  This may explain why TBQ ratio is not a popular indicator of performance in the 
Kenyan commercial banking sector. The above findings may also be attributed to the fact that out of the forty 
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three commercial banks operating in Kenya only eleven are listed. Data used in calculating TBQ ratio can 
reliably be drawn from the results of listed banks as opposed to non-listed banks. Bhagat and Black (2002) find 
no relationship between Tobin’s Q ratio and board independence when financial statement data is used; whereas 
there is some relationship when stock return data is used. 
The findings made when ROA and ROE were adopted as performance measures are in line with those 
of Coleman (2007) who finds  no significant relationship at 5% level between board independence and 
performance of firms for the period between 1997 and 2001 in Kenya. Pi and Timme (1993), Adams and Mehran 
(2002) find that the proportion of outside directors on the board is not related to the performance measures 
because such outside directors entails costs to the firm. Love and Rachinsk. (2007) and Romano et al. (2012), 
also find no relationship between the presence of independent directors in the banks’ board with their 
performance (ROE).  
The results in the coefficients tables: 3, 5, 7and 4.12 all indicate that Multicolinearity is not a problem. 
The tolerance levels are equal to 1 and the VIF values are perfectly below 10 an indication that the variables do 
not reach levels that indicate the presence of multi-colinearity. (Myers, 1990). 
 
5. Conclusion 
On overall the study finds that there is no significant relationship between board composition and performance 
of commercial banks in Kenya using the three performance measures (ROA, ROE and TBQ ratio). Therefore the 
proponents of board independence should note with caution that the presence of a high proportion of the 
independent directors on the banks board has no significant relationship with their performance. If the purpose of 
the board independence is to improve performance then such may not have any effect. Hence, policy makers and 
individual banks should consider other governance variables that can help improve banks performance. The 
above findings may explain why within a period of less than one and a half decades Central Bank of Kenya has 
released three prudential guidelines on corporate governance in the banking sector that stress on different 
variables from time to time. The results further indicate that  the relationship between board composition as a 
governance variable and  performance of commercial banks in Kenya in terms of TBQ ratio can only be 
correctly ascertained when the data used in  its  tabulation is drawn from the stock exchange but not through 
computations from annual financial reports. 
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